Statutory Construction and Policy Arguments for a Symmetric Approach to Promulgating Guidelines for New Section 102(b) Subparagraphs (A) and (B)—The First-to-publish Grace Period Exceptions to Prior Art by Pedersen, Brad & Hansen, Christian
Cybaris®
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 2
2013
Statutory Construction and Policy Arguments for a
Symmetric Approach to Promulgating Guidelines
for New Section 102(b) Subparagraphs (A) and
(B)—The First-to-publish Grace Period
Exceptions to Prior Art
Brad Pedersen
Christian Hansen
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cybaris® by an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Pedersen, Brad and Hansen, Christian (2013) "Statutory Construction and Policy Arguments for a Symmetric Approach to
Promulgating Guidelines for New Section 102(b) Subparagraphs (A) and (B)—The First-to-publish Grace Period Exceptions to Prior
Art," Cybaris®: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol4/iss1/2
[4:102 2013] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  
	  
102 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 
FOR A SYMMETRIC APPROACH TO PROMULGATING GUIDELINES 
FOR NEW SECTION 102(B) SUBPARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) –  
THE FIRST-TO-PUBLISH GRACE PERIOD EXCEPTIONS TO PRIOR ART 
 
BRAD PEDERSEN† and CHRISTIAN HANSEN‡ 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 103 
II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 103 
A. The First-Inventor-to-File Provisions ........................................................ 104 
B. First-to-Publish Exceptions ........................................................................ 106 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ....................................................................... 111 
A. First Construction Error—Inconsistent Phrase Construction .................... 115 
B. Second Construction Error—Improper Focus on Only the “Differences” 121 
C. Third Construction Error—A Narrow Standard Renders Third-Party FTP 
Exceptions Superfluous ................................................................................... 122 
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................... 124 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 126 
VI. POST SCRIPT .................................................................................................. 126 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† Brad Pedersen is a shareholder with the law firm of Patterson Thuente Pedersen, P.A. He is 
also an author of The “Matrix” For Changing First-To-Invent: An Experimental Investigation into 
Proposed Changes in U.S. Patent Law, 1 CYBARIS AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2010). The views 
expressed in this article are not attributable to the law firm or to any clients of the law firm. 
‡ Christian Hansen is an associate attorney with the law firm of Patterson Thuente Pedersen, 
P.A. and a 2012 graduate of William Mitchell College of Law. 
1
Pedersen and Hansen: Statutory Construction and Policy Arguments for a Symmetric Appro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
[4:102 2013]           Statutory Construction and Policy Arguments 
for a Symmetric Approach to Promulgating Guidelines for 
New Section 102(b) Subparagraphs (A) and (B) – 
the First-to-Publish Grace Period Exceptions to Prior Art 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 26, 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
published Proposed Examination Guidelines for the new First-Inventor-to-File 
(FITF) provisions enacted by Section 3 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA).1 These Proposed Guidelines set out the Office’s interpretation of the new 
FITF provisions and are aimed at advising the public and the Examining Corps on 
how the changes may impact the provisions of the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (MPEP).2 The most important of the new FITF provisions are the 
major revisions to New Section 102, including New Section 102(b), defining the 
only exceptions to what otherwise will be considered prior art under New Section 
102(a)—often referred to as the First-To-Publish (FTP) Grace Period Exceptions. 
The Proposed Examination Guidelines have added fuel to the current debate over 
how the new FTP Grace Period Exceptions should be interpreted. This article 
presents both statutory construction and policy arguments for why the Proposed 
Examination Guidelines should be modified to adopt a symmetric approach to 
how the Office will interpret and implement the FTP Grace Period Exceptions of 
New Section 102(b) subparagraph (A)—for the inventor’s own grace period prior 
art—and subparagraph (B)—for the grace period prior art of third parties. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
For the general public, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 has 
been publicized as a package of reforms that should improve the U.S. patent 
system. In theory, these improvements include changes that move the U.S. patent 
system closer toward harmonization with other patent systems around the world, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,759–73 (proposed July 26, 2012) (the 
“Proposed Rules”) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). An early version of this article was 
submitted to the USPTO on October 6, 2012 on behalf of the Minnesota Intellectual Property 
Lawyers Association (MIPLA) as comments to the Proposed Rules. See Letter from Brad 
Pedersen, Patent Practice Chair, Patterson Thuente Pedersen, P.A., to Mary C. Till, Senior Legal 
Advisor, USPTO (Oct. 6, 2012) (on file with USPTO) (titled “Comments on Proposed Rules for: 
Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-File [sic] Provisions of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759 et seq. (July 26, 2012)”), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/mipla_20121006-guid.pdf. On February 14, 2013 
before the publication of this article was finalized, the final rules were issued. See Examination 
Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,059–87 (Feb. 14, 2013) (the “Final Rules”) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). While the comments in the Final Rules addressed some, but not all, of the 
arguments made in this article, the Final Rules essentially maintained the narrow construction of 
the FTP Grace Period Exceptions of subparagraph (B) as originally presented in the Proposed 
Rules. See infra Part VI. 
2 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,760. 
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and address acknowledged problems in the way that the USPTO sets fees and the 
ways in which the validity of patents can be challenged at the USPTO instead of 
in the courts. The ultimate goal of these changes is to encourage investment in 
innovation and, as a result, stimulate job growth. 
For inventors, patent owners and patent professionals, the AIA represents the 
biggest set of changes to U.S. patent laws since 1836. Initially introduced in 
Congress in 2005, the final bill signed into law on September 16, 2011 includes 
three major changes along with a wide variety of other, less significant changes. 
Most of the high-profile changes associated with patent litigation issues that were 
included in previous versions of the bill, were ultimately rejected and left on the 
congressional cutting-room floor.  Even after the cuts, the final bill was still more 
than 150 pages long.3 Given that many of the major changes are phased in over 
time and apply prospectively to newly filed patent applications, it could be a 
decade or more before the true impact of these changes to the U.S. patent system 
can be evaluated. 
The three major changes to the U.S. patent system that have been or will be 
implemented under the AIA are: (1) first-inventor-to-file; (2) fee setting, but not 
fee spending, authority; and (3) revamped processes for challenging validity at the 
USPTO.  This article focuses on the first of these major changes—the new FITF 
provisions. 
A. The First-Inventor-to-File Provisions 
The AIA changes the U.S. from the current first-to-invent (FTI) patent system 
to a FITF patent system with a FTP grace period by significantly rewriting 35 
U.S.C. § 102. The new FITF system applies to any provisional, new utility or 
continuing application filed after March 16, 2013—the cutover date. Pre-AIA law 
will apply to any continuation or divisional application filed after the cutover date 
claiming priority to a case filed before the cutover date; however, a continuation-
in-part (CIP) or converted provisional filed after the cutover will be governed by 
either AIA or pre-AIA law on a claim-by-claim basis, depending on the effective 
priority date of each claim.4 
Section 102(a) of the AIA lays the foundation of the new FITF provisions.  
New Section 102(a) is reproduced below: 
(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART. – A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless– 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
4 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,749; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(n), 125 Stat. 
at 293.	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(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or 
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued 
under section 151, or in an application for patent published or 
deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or 
application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was 
effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.5 
The drafters of the New Section 102(a) sought to simplify the provisions for 
what is and what is not prior art under the new FITF system by defining just two 
types of prior art.6 The two types of prior art under the new FITF system are 
publicly available prior art, as defined by New Section 102(a)(1),7 and patent 
filing prior art, as defined by New Section 102(a)(2).8 Accordingly, under New 
Section 102(a)(1), novelty-destroying prior art exists if a disclosure of the claimed 
invention was publicly accessible anywhere in the world before the effective 
filing date. Under New Section 102(a)(2), novelty-destroying prior art exists if the 
claimed invention was described in an earlier filed non-public U.S./U.S. Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent application of another inventor that is later 
issued or published. It is important to note the terms “claimed invention,” 
“effective filing date,” “inventor,” and “effectively filed” have all been expressly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 285–86 (outlining the new “§ 102. 
Conditions for patentability; novelty”) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a)). 
6 See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for 
Patenting, 40 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q. J. 1, 10–11 (2012). 
7 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 285–87 (outlining the new “§ 102. 
Conditions for patentability; novelty”) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(1)). This includes inventions that have been patented, published in a printed publication, 
have been in public use, have been on sale (anywhere in the world), or were otherwise made 
publically available. This does not include inventions which have merely been the subject of an 
offer for sale or were otherwise considered “secret prior art.” 
8 Id. § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 285–87 (outlining the new “§ 102. Conditions for patentability; 
novelty”) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)). This includes 
inventions that have been patented or published (or deemed published). Because the Hilmer 
doctrine has been eliminated, this also includes PCT and foreign applications designating the 
United States. See generally Richard A. Neifeld, Viability of the Hilmer Doctrine, 81 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 544, 546 (1999) (providing a definition of the Hilmer Doctrine). This 
does not include abandoned applications, applications with secrecy orders, unconverted 
provisional applications, or PCT and foreign not filed in or not designating the United States. 
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defined in New Section 101, and those definitions are critical to understanding the 
scope of both types of prior art. 
These changes have been characterized as attempts to more closely align U.S. 
patent law with the absolute novelty requirement that is used by virtually all other 
countries around the world.9 By focusing only on what is publicly accessible, the 
various kinds of “secret” prior art that had been available under the Old Section 
102, such as offers for sale and prior, non-public invention, may not be considered 
prior art for patent applications governed by the AIA.10 The FITF system under 
the AIA eliminates the Hilmer doctrine and accords foreign national applications 
their foreign filing date if they are filed directly in the U.S. or as a PCT 
application designating the U.S. and published in one of the ten current official 
PCT languages.11 The change to FITF also phases out interference proceedings 
and replaces them with a new “derivation” proceeding for claims governed by the 
AIA.12  
B. First-to-Publish Exceptions  
Nevertheless, the AIA does not bring U.S. Patent law into complete 
conformance with the absolute novelty requirement.13 Specifically, there are a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Brad Pedersen & Justin Woo, The “Matrix” For Changing First-To-Invent: An 
Experimental Investigation into Proposed Changes in U.S. Patent Law, 1 CYBARIS AN INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010). 
10 Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,759, 43,765 n.29 (proposed July 26, 2012) 
(the “Proposed Rules”) (“The legislative history of the AIA indicates that the inclusion of this 
clause in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) should be viewed as indicating that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) 
does not cover non-public uses or non-public offers for sale.”). 
11 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 285–86 (outlining the new “§ 102. 
Conditions for patentability; novelty”) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a)). 
12 Id. § 3(i), 125 Stat. at 289 (outlining the new “§ 135. Derivation proceedings”) (effective 
Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135).	  
13 David Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce, Dir., USPTO, Speech at the Managing IP 
International Patent Forum: A Global Call for Harmonization (Apr. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos_london.jsp (Director Kappos stating that rather 
than focusing on pure harmonization the new AIA “must be rooted in global best policies and 
practices—basic principals [sic], we agree define [sic] a 21st century patent system that maximally 
accelerates technological progress”). See also Robert A. Armitage, Senior Vice President, Gen. 
Counsel, Eli Lilly & Co., Address Before the United States House of Representatives Committee 
on the Judiciary (May 16, 2012), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_05162012.html. Robert Armitage 
summarized U.S. leadership regarding past harmonization efforts and the current push behind the 
AIA:  
For decades, efforts at U.S. leadership on creating more globally 
harmonized patent laws have been stymied because the majority of the U.S. 
5
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number of exceptions to New Section 102(a) that appear in New Section 102(b). 
New Section 102(b) is reproduced below: 
(b) EXCEPTIONS. – 
(1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE 
FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION. – A disclosure made 1 
year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention 
shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection 
(a)(1) if – 
(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint 
inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter 
disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint 
inventor; or 
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such [grace 
period public] disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the 
inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the 
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the 
inventor or a joint inventor. 
(2) DISCLOSURES APPEARING IN APPLICATIONS AND PATENTS. – 
A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under 
subsection (a)(2) if – 
(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly 
or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or 
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such 
subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), 
been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint inventor or 
another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly 
or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor, or 
(C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed 
invention, not later than the effective filing date of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
patent community had no interest in seeing our patentability standards and 
criteria exported globally. When U.S. interests defined the “best practices” 
internationally for crafting a patent law and patent system, those practices were 
in key respects absent in our laws. The AIA has ended that era of followership 
for the United States. The supporters of the AIA look at its provisions as the 
epitome of best patenting practices. 
Id. 
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claimed invention, were owned by the same person or 
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.14 
Generally, these exceptions—often referred to as the FTP Grace Period 
Exceptions—permit the inventor a grace period where the invention may be 
publicly disclosed without destroying patentability. New Section 102(b)(1) 
applies to Section 102(a)(1) prior art and has two separate exceptions, while New 
Section 102(b)(2) applies to Section 102(a)(2) prior art and has three exceptions.15  
New Section 102(b)(1)’s two exceptions provide that: (A) a public disclosure 
of the inventor’s own work will not be deemed prior art, as long as the disclosure 
did not occur more than one year prior to filing; and (B) any subsequent 
disclosure by a third party based on a previous public disclosure of the inventor’s 
own work will not be deemed prior art, as long as the subsequent disclosure 
pertains to the same subject matter that was previously disclosed.16 Thus, with 
exception (B), the inventor must first publish the subject matter himself. 
New Section 102(b)(2)’s three exceptions provide that: (A) a patent filing of 
another that actually represents the inventor’s own work, that was directly or 
indirectly obtained from the inventor will not be deemed prior art; (B) a patent 
filing of a third-party that pre-dates the effective filing date of the inventor’s 
application, but post-dates a publication made by or for the inventor will not be 
deemed prior art; and (C) the patent filings of others working for the same 
company or for a joint research and development project will not be deemed prior 
art17 (replicating the so-called “team exception” of old section 103(c)18). The new 
“team exception,” however, now applies not only to issues of obviousness, but 
also to issues of anticipation. Additionally, the time period for when parties must 
be on the same team starts as of the filing date, not the date of invention. 
Thus, the single biggest change under the FITF system for patent practitioners 
who prosecute patent applications is the elimination of “swearing behind” as an 
option for removing prior art that was between a date of invention and a filing 
date. The second biggest change under the FITF system is the proactive 
publication that is required to trigger the FTP grace period. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286 (outlining the new “§ 102. 




17 Id.; Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767 (proposed July 26, 2012) (the 
“Proposed Rules”) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
18 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). 
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With respect to the USPTO’s Proposed Examination Guidelines,19 it is the 
Office’s interpretation of what qualifies as the same “subject matter disclosed” 
previously under the New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B) that is of concern. The 
Office has interpreted the statute very narrowly, such that if the third party 
changes the subject matter disclosed from what the inventor had previously 
disclosed—even if those changes are merely “insubstantial” or “trivial”—
subsequent third-party disclosure could be used as prior art against the inventor.20 
Such an interpretation would permit a third party to publish following its 
awareness of the public disclosure by the inventor by including some small 
variation in their publication. Consequently, the inventor would be prevented 
from utilizing the FTP Grace Period Exception provided under New Section 
102(b). 
The Office’s narrow interpretation is in direct conflict with how the 
substantial majority of patent practitioners have interpreted the language of New 
Section 102(b) subparagraph (B). 21  Most practitioners have interpreted 
subparagraph (B) more broadly to mean that if an inventor publically discloses his 
invention, then subsequent publications cannot be used against the inventor to 
defeat patentability. Thus, most practitioners were under the impression that early 
public disclosure would effectively inoculate an inventor against subsequent 
third-party disclosures. This interpretation is not unfounded; rather, it is grounded 
in comments found in the Congressional Record. Senator Kyl (R-AZ) stated that 
“under new section 102(b)(1)(B), once the U.S. inventor discloses his invention, 
no subsequent prior art can defeat the invention.”22 However, under the Office’s 
Proposed Examination Guidelines, this interpretation would not be implemented. 
For illustration, imagine that an independent inventor, who is a small business 
owner, conceives of an idea. She thinks it is a pretty good idea but is not sure if it 
is marketable, so she publically discloses the idea on her website to see if it 
attracts any interest (disclosing A+B+C). The idea catches on and all signs 
indicate that it will be profitable, so within one year of the public disclosure she 
files a patent (claiming A+B). However, before she filed her patent application a 
third party copied portions of her disclosure. The third party added to the copied 
portions of inventor’s disclosure before posting the new disclosure on their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,759–73. 
20 Id. at 43,767. 
21 Gene Quinn, Defending the USPTO Interpretation of the New Grace Period, IPWATCHDOG 
(Oct. 9, 2012, 9:00AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/09/09/defending-the-uspto-
interpretation-of-the-new-grace-period/id=27903. 
22  S. JOURNAL, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. 5319, 5320 (2011), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20110906-kyl_rmrks_s5319.pdf. 
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website (disclosing A+B+C+D).23 During prosecution, the Examiner sees both 
publications and rejects all claims as anticipated under New Section 102(a). The 
inventor can overcome her own disclosure according to the New Section 
102(b)(1)(A) exception, but under the Proposed Examination Guidelines for New 
Section 102(b)(1)(B) she cannot overcome the third-party disclosure rejection 





The same outcome occurs when the third party under-discloses what had 
previously been disclosed by the inventor. In other words, if the inventor discloses 
A+B+C, and a third party subsequently discloses A+B, the third-party disclosure 
would be prior art under New Section 102(a). No exception would apply under 
New Section 102(b)(1)(B) as interpreted by the Proposed Examination 
Guidelines.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 A number of reference websites, such as Wikipedia.com, commonly employ this practice. 
24 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,759, 43,767, 43,769.	  
25 Id. at 43,767.	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Thus, if the Proposed Examination Guidelines are adopted by the Patent 
Office, both a subsequent over-disclosure and a subsequent under-disclosure of an 
inventor’s earlier publication by a third party could serve as a bar to patentability. 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
While there are many different ways in which variations on the words 
“disclose” and “describe” are used throughout the AIA and within New Section 
102, 26  the Proposed Guidelines take the approach of “treating the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 New Section 102 of the AIA is reproduced below with some editorial insertions and 
emphasis added to highlight and clarify any variations on the words “disclose” and “describe” 
used in this section in order to better frame the discussion on the statutory interpretation of the 
FTP Grace Period Exceptions: 
 
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty. 
(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART. – A person shall be entitled to a patent unless– 
 (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or 
 (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 
151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 
122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another 
inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention. 
(b) EXCEPTIONS. – 
 (1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING 
DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION. – A [grace period public] disclosure made 1 
10
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year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be 
prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if – 
 (A) the [grace period public] disclosure was made by the 
inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter 
disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or 
 (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such [grace period 
public] disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint 
inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly 
or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. 
 (2) DISCLOSURES APPEARING IN APPLICATIONS AND PATENTS. – [grace 
period public] disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under 
subsection (a)(2) if – 
 (A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or 
indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or 
 (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such [grace period 
patent filing] subject matter was effectively filed under subsection 
(a)(2) [as determined pursuant to section (d)], been publicly disclosed 
by the inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the subject 
matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint 
inventor, or 
 (C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not 
later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned 
by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the 
same person. 
(c) COMMON OWNERSHIP UNDER JOINT RESEARCH AGREEMENTS. – Subject 
matter disclosed and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned 
by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person 
in applying the provisions of subsection (b)(2)(C) if – 
 (1) the subject matter disclosed was developed and the claimed 
invention was made by, or on behalf of, 1 or more parties to a joint research 
agreement that was in effect on or before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention; 
 (2) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken 
within the scope of the joint research agreement; and 
 (3) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is 
amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement. 
(d) PATENTS AND PUBLISHED APPLICATIONS EFFECTIVE AS PRIOR ART. – 
For purposes of determining whether a patent or application is prior art to a 
claimed invention under subsection (a)(2), such patent or application shall be 
considered to have been effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter 
described in the patent or application – 
 (1) if paragraph (2) does not apply, as of the actual filing date of the 
patent or the application for patent; or  
 (2) if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a right of priority 
under section 119, 365(a), or 365(b), or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under 
section 120, 121 or 365(c), based upon 1 or more prior filed applications for patent, as of 
the filing date of the earliest of such application that describes the subject matter. 
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‘disclosure’ [as used in New Sections 102(b)(1) and 102(b)(2)] as a generic 
expression intended to encompass the documents and activities enumerated in 
New Section 102(a).” 27  This approach is both useful and appropriate for 
evaluating all of the various kinds and ways in which the “how” of a disclosure 
may be made in order to determine whether those actions or things qualify as: (i) 
prior art under New Section 102(a), and (ii) triggers for an FTP Grace Period 
Exception under New Section 102(b). In essence, the approach ensures that there 
is symmetry between how the Office will evaluate actions or things under new 
Section 102(a) for whether those actions or things qualify as publicly available 
prior art or patent filings. It also ensures that the Office will evaluate actions or 
things under New Section 102(b) for whether those actions or things constitute a 
triggering public disclosure for purposes of invoking the FTP Grace Period 
Exception.   
However, the Proposed Guidelines do not use the same kind of symmetric 
approach when it comes to determining what will be considered within the scope 
of the FTP Grace Period Exceptions.  Specifically, the phrase “subject matter 
disclosed” has been getting most of the attention in the debate over the proper 
interpretation of the FITF provisions.28 The Proposed Guidelines end up with an 
open and broader view of the scope of what the FTP Grace Period Exceptions 
cover for inventor-related matters under New Section 102(b) subparagraph (A),29 
but take a very narrow view of the scope of what the FTP Grace Period 
Exceptions cover for third-party-related matters under New Section 102(b) 
subparagraph (B).30 The apparent reason for this difference is that the Proposed 
Guidelines focus exclusively on answering the “who” question when it comes to 
the inventor-related FTP Grace Period Exceptions of New Section 102(b) 
subparagraph (A). In other words, the Patent Office appears to be concerned with 
who made the disclosure and whether there is proof that the disclosure was made 
by or for the inventor. So much so, in fact, that for the third-party-related FTP 
Grace Period Exceptions of New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B), the Proposed 
Guidelines add a “what” question to the analysis.31 Specifically, the Patent Office 
asks what the disclosure by or for the inventor was, and whether that disclosure is 
similar enough in subject matter to the disclosure by the third party so as to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) 
(emphasis added) (outlining the new “§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty”) (effective 
Mar. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(d)). 
27 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,763–64. 
28 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286. 
29 See Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,765–66. 
30 See id. at 43,766–67. 
31 See id.	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invoke the third-party-related FTP Grace Period Exceptions. More importantly, 
the Proposed Guidelines answer this additional “what” question with a new and 
very narrow test for determining the scope of what will be considered within the 
FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party-related materials. 
From a statutory construction analysis, there is no basis for any kind of 
asymmetric approach. New Section 102 requires consistent approaches to 
answering both the “who” and the “what” questions in determining whether the 
FTP Grace Period Exceptions may or may not apply, regardless of whether the 
exceptions are applied to the inventor’s own grace-period prior art or the grace-
period prior art of third parties. Furthermore, there is absolutely no basis in New 
Section 102 for creating a very narrow test when answering the “what” question 
for the grace-period prior art of third parties.   
The relevant portion of the Proposed Guidelines that tees up the narrow view 
of the “what” question that must be answered when evaluating the FTP Grace 
Period Exceptions for third-party-related matters is reproduced below: 
The exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) applies if the “ 
‘subject matter’ disclosed [in the prior art disclosure] had, before 
such [prior art] disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor 
or a joint inventor.” Thus, the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) 
requires that the subject matter in the prior disclosure being relied 
upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) be the same “subject matter” as the 
subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior 
art disclosure for the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) to apply. 
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior 
art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the 
subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior 
art disclosure are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or 
obvious variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) 
does not apply.32 
We now divide this section into three parts to highlight three separate errors in 
statutory analysis that result in the Proposed Guidelines getting it wrong in 
proposing a narrow view of the FTP Grace Period Exceptions for third-party-
related matters under the New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B). The first error 
relates to the focus on interpreting just the phrase “subject matter,” instead of 
recognizing that it is the entire phrase “subject matter disclosed” that must be 
construed. The second error relates to the consequences of improperly focusing on 
just the “differences” between the disclosure triggering the exception and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id. at 43,767. 
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prior art that might be subject to the exception. The third error relates to the 
improper creation of a new standard that is so narrow, it renders the FTP 
exceptions for third-party-related materials effectively meaningless.  
A. First Construction Error—Inconsistent Phrase Construction 
It appears that the first error arises out of an incorrect assumption that the term 
“disclosed” in subparagraph (B) can be construed separately from the term 
“subject matter.” This is illustrated by the Office’s comment that: 
[T]he exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) requires that the 
subject matter in the prior disclosure being relied upon under 35 
U.S.C. 102(a) be the same “subject matter” as the subject matter 
publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure 
for the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) to apply.33 
The “how” question must be answered for the FTP exceptions for third-party-
related materials (i.e., how was the initial disclosure was made). The answer, 
however, does not need to be found in the phrase “subject matter disclosed” in 
subparagraph (B), as that requires separation of the term “subject matter” from the 
term “disclosed.” Rather, the answer to the “how” question can be found in the 
phrase “publicly disclosed.” Accordingly, there is no need to interpret the term 
“disclosed” as somehow being separate from the term “subject matter,” such that 
the word “disclosed” would need to be interpreted as a variation of the words 
“disclose” or “describe,” which are terms used elsewhere in New Section 102(a). 
The correct approach to interpreting New Section 102(b) is to start by 
presuming that where one section uses different words or phrases than another 
section, Congress must have intended the words or phrases to have different 
meanings.34 Using such an approach to statutory construction is particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Id.; see new § 102(b) subparagraph (1)(B): 
 
Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed 
invention . . . shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsections 
(a)(1) [and (a)(2)] if … the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, 
been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who 
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a 
joint inventor. 
 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act  § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286 (emphasis added). 
34 See DirectTV Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Where the words of a 
later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same or related subject, the Congress must 
have intended them to have a different meaning.” (quoting Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 
851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988))), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989); c.f. Nijhawan v. 
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important in this situation where the specific phrase “subject matter disclosed” is 
a phrase that is wholly unique to New Sections 102(b) and 102(c). In fact, the 
phrase “subject matter disclosed” is used nine different times in these two 
sections, but is not used anywhere else in the AIA or in 35 U.S.C. As will be seen 
from the analysis and discussion that follows, in order for the phrase “subject 
matter disclosed” to be understood as referring to the same actions or things over 
the nine different usages, the phrase “subject matter disclosed” should be 
understood as referring to the conveyance of information about an invention 
before that invention has been fully described, enabled or claimed.   
Inherent in this interpretation is the understanding that this phrase 
encompasses a conveyance of information without the invention being fully 
described, enabled, or claimed. Consequently, the “subject matter disclosed” 
references information that may be amorphous and imprecise and that very likely 
will change and mature as the information about the invention is refined into a 
fully described, enabled, and claimed invention. It is also important to note that 
the phrase “subject matter disclosed” that is used in New Sections 102(b) and (c) 
refers to conveyances of information about an invention that are both private (e.g., 
the conveyance of information about an invention by an inventor to someone else 
within a company who is directed to prepare and publicly release information 
about the invention, or prepare and file a patent application for the invention) and 
public (e.g., the publication, public disclosure, patent filing that is later published, 
or other ways of making of information about the invention publicly available). 
To provide a context for why the phrase “subject matter disclosed” must be 
understood as suggested, and to better appreciate the challenges Congress had in 
codifying an understanding about an invention before that invention has been 
fully described, enabled or claimed, it is helpful to graphically present a 
simplified diagram of the invention process by which ideas are turned into real 
embodiments of an invention. The figure below outlines the various steps that can 
occur in what will be referred to as the Continuums of Invention.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39 (2009) (“Where . . . Congress uses similar statutory language and similar 
statutory structure in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations.”). 
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The Continuums of Invention start when ideas about an invention are formed 
or conceived, a part of the process that has come to be known as the “conception” 
of an invention.35 After this, the process can diverge into different paths that may 
or may not involve further development, refinements, and testing of the invention 
(i.e., “experimentation”). Sometimes, there may be actual building or conducting 
of examples of the invention in a part of the process referred to as “actual 
reduction to practice.” 36  Other times, the first reduction to practice is the 
preparation and filing of a patent application, a “constructive reduction to 
practice.”37 Before or after the filing of a patent application, information about the 
invention may also be made publicly available, for example by publication of an 
academic paper or presentation of a video on a web site, in what will be referred 
to as a “description” of the invention. It should be noted that a patent application 
must also have a “written description” as part of the requirements of § 112. To be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship . . . .” (citing Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994))). 
36 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
37 Id. (citing Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 865 n.16 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (defining constructive 
reduction to practice as “the filing of a complete and allowable application”)). 
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sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 112, a patent application must convey 
enough information about the invention to permit a person skilled in the art to 
make and practice that invention; this is often referred to as the “enablement 
requirement.”38 For purposes of patenting an invention, the invention must also be 
“claimed” in that a patent application must include at least one claim that sets 
forth the legal metes and bounds of the invention.39 Also, before or after a claimed 
invention has been prosecuted and issued as a patent, there may or may not be 
actual real world embodiments of the invention that are made, used or sold, which 
are shown in the Continuums of Invention as “embodiments” representing the 
final part of the process. 
Thus, it can be seen that for any given invention, the actual path along the 
Continuums of Invention can only be determined by a post hoc analysis. Just like 
deciding whether a given real world embodiment does or does not infringe an 
issued and valid patent claim, a determination of the actual path can only be made 
after the patent has been issued and after the particular embodiment of the method 
or apparatus has been made, used, or sold.  
The Continuums of Invention diagram illustrates why the two occurrences of 
the phrase “subject matter disclosed” in the context of the FTP Grace Period 
Exceptions of subparagraph (B) of New Section 102(b) must be interpreted as 
referring to a conveyance of information somewhere in the middle of the 
Continuums of Invention. The proper interpretation of the phrase “subject matter 
disclosed” is not at the extreme of a specific embodiment of the information—
where the USPTO Proposed Examination Guidelines would place it—rather it is 
somewhere in the middle, between conception and the final embodiment.   
The Continuums of Invention diagram also illustrates why an asymmetric 
interpretation of the phrase “subject matter disclosed,” when applied only with 
respect to the FTP Grace Period Exceptions of New Section 102(b) subparagraph 
(B), results in an inconsistent and improper construction of the statute. Under 
New Section 102(b) subparagraph (A), there are two ways in which the grace 
period public disclosure can be triggered: (i) if public disclosure is “made by the 
inventor or joint inventor,” or (ii) if public disclosure is made “by another who 
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a 
joint inventor.”40 Thus, the phrase “subject matter disclosed” as used in the New 
Section 102(b) subparagraph (A) provides the context of how an inventor can 
internally convey information to others who then trigger the FTP Grace Period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
40 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) 
(emphasis added).	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Exception. This same internally conveyed context in which an inventor conveys 
information to another, who is not an inventor (i.e., a third-party), who then 
publicly discloses some version of that information, can also be found in the four 
occurrences of the phrase “subject matter disclosed” throughout New Section 
102(b) subparagraph (B). 
If the narrow interpretation set forth in the Proposed Examination Guidelines 
is used in either of the internally conveyed contexts, the result is plainly not what 
Congress intended. Assume, for example, that the information representing the 
subject matter is conveyed from an inventor to an editor who then refines and 
revises an article for publication. These changes by the editor are almost certain to 
add some “insubstantial changes” to the information conveyed from the 
inventor.41 This would mean that the exception for the inventor’s own work 
would not apply even when the content of the subject matter was changed by an 
insubstantial amount by a person who, with authority from the inventor, receives, 
revises, and then publishes the information. 
Another example of why a narrow interpretation used in an “internally 
conveyed” context does not operate in a manner that Congress intended occurs in 
a situation involving the further refinement of the subject matter conveyed from 
an inventor by a non-inventor who assists in the actual reduction to practice of the 
invention. Assistance in the actual reduction to practice is quite common, 
particularly with more complicated inventions. If that assistance does not rise to 
the level of a patentable contribution to the initial conception, then the individuals 
who are assisting in the actual reduction to practice are not deemed to be 
inventors, even though they are almost certain to make “insubstantial changes” to 
the subject matter information about the invention that was conveyed to them.42 
Again, this example shows how the exception for the inventor’s own work under 
a narrow interpretation of the phrase “subject matter disclosed” would not apply if 
the inventor receives help from others in taking conception to actual reduction to 
practice. 
A final example of how a narrow interpretation used in an “internally 
conveyed” context would operate in a manner that is not what Congress intended 
is a situation involving the conveyance of information about the subject matter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767 (proposed July 26, 2012) (the 
“Proposed Rules”) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
42 See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“An inventor ‘may use the services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting his 
invention without losing his right to a patent.’” (quoting Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 
451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971))). 
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an invention from an inventor to a patent attorney for purposes of preparing a 
patent application for that invention. Where the invention has not yet been 
reduced to practice, the filing of the patent application is referred to as a 
constructive reduction to practice. Again, the patent attorney is almost certain to 
make “insubstantial changes” to the information that represents the subject matter 
for the invention as part of the preparation of the patent application.43 So, if the 
narrow interpretation of “subject matter disclosed” is used, the essential process 
of formalizing the subject matter of an invention as part of preparation of a patent 
application would likely cause the inventor to lose the benefit of any exceptions 
for his own work with respect to other patent filings that end up being 
published.44 
The remaining three occurrences of the phrase “subject matter disclosed” 
occur in the context of determining the timing of when an invention is 
“developed” for purposes of determining whether the so-called “team” exceptions 
of New Section 102(b)(2)(C) apply, or whether the Joint Research Agreements 
exception of the New Section 102(c) applies. Again, in these instances, none of 
the occurrences of the phrase “subject matter disclosed” used in the context of the 
“team” exceptions would operate as intended if a narrow construction of this 
phrase is adopted. 
As shown in the figure below, the proper interpretation of the phrase “subject 
matter disclosed” must occur along the Continuums of Invention someplace after 
some or all of conception, experimentation and reduction to practice happen, and 
before the description, enablement, claims and specific embodiments are 
formalized in a patent application or public disclosure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,767. 
44 The same would apply where the inventor applies for and obtains a foreign filing license. 
Any translation and formatting required for filing in another country would almost certainly 
constitute more than a mere insubstantial change to a prior publication in the U.S.	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B. Second Construction Error—Improper Focus on Only the “Differences” 
As part of the narrow construction accorded to the FTP Grace Period 
Exception for third-party-related materials, the Proposed Examination Guidelines 
set forth a standard that looks only to differences in the prior art versus the 
triggering disclosure. This is illustrated by the Office’s comments that: 
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the 
prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and 
the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such 
prior art disclosure [are merely insubstantial or trivial, then the 
exception does not apply].45   
This proposed standard would require that the statutory language be amenable 
to interpretation such that each of the “subject matter disclosed” and the “[grace 
period public] disclosure” or the “[grace period patent filing] disclosure” of New 
Section 102 can be analyzed in pieces, instead of being analyzed as a whole.46 A 
plain reading of the statutory language makes clear that the statute is referencing 
the entirety of both the publicly disclosed actions/things by or for the inventor and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,767 (emphasis added). 
46 See infra text accompanying notes 33–43. 
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the grace period disclosures by a third party. No support or rationale is provided 
in the Proposed Examination Guidelines to justify a piece-meal approach to 
evaluating whether to invoke the FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party-
related materials. Moreover, if the proposed standard is susceptible to a piece-
meal evaluation, then the proposed standard is also vague in that it is unclear 
whether the exception is being applied to only the differences or to the entire 
grace period disclosure by a third party. 
A standard that focuses solely on express differences ignores a well-
established body of case law with respect to inherent disclosures.47 The trivial or 
insubstantial differences in the express disclosures of a prior art disclosure versus 
the triggering disclosure may, in fact, be inherently disclosed. In these situations, 
a strict application of the proposed narrow standard would run counter to the 
doctrine of inherent disclosure. Under the doctrine of inherent disclosure, an 
earlier reference may anticipate a later reference even though it may not disclose a 
particular characteristic expressly disclosed in the later reference, provided that 
the missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent in the anticipating 
reference.48 Thus, it is a realistic possibility that under the narrow interpretation 
presented by the Proposed Examination Guidelines, a later publication by a third 
party could defeat patentability by publically disclosing something that was 
inherently—but not expressly—present in a earlier disclosure.  
While Congress gave the Patent Office limited rulemaking authority in the 
context of implementing the new Post-Grant Review Proceedings,49 there was no 
provision for providing the Patent Office with substantive rulemaking authority 
for implementing the FITF provisions of the AIA. Because the proposed narrow 
standard creates an entirely new standard that is not found in any current case law, 
it appears that the Office has exceeded its procedural rule making authority in 
proposing the narrow standard.50  
C. Third Construction Error—A Narrow Standard Renders Third-Party FTP 
Exceptions Superfluous 
The new narrow standard found in the Proposed Examination Guidelines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
48 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc, 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
49 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. 284, 302–03, 
308–09 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012) (to be codified 35 U.S.C. §§ 316, 326). 
50 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) 
does not vest the USPTO with any general substantive rulemaking power; a principle amply 
supported by Federal Circuit precedent), vacated 2009 WL 1916498 (2009); see also Cooper 
Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that to comply with § 
2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must govern the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office). 
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would be so narrow that it would render the FTP exceptions for third-party-related 
materials effectively meaningless. Specifically, here we are referring to the 
Office’s comments that: 
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the 
prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and 
the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such 
prior art disclosure are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial 
or obvious variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) 
does not apply.51 
It is acknowledged even by those supporting the narrow standard found in the 
Proposed Examination Guidelines that the chances of having an independent 
third-party disclosure that would not have “trivial” or “insubstantial differences” 
from the subject matter publicly disclosed by or for an inventor are so small as to 
represent a practically impossible fact pattern.52 Consequently, the only FTP 
Grace Period Exception that would be given any meaning under the New Section 
102(b) would be the FTP Grace Period Exception for the inventor’s own work 
under New Section 102(b) subparagraph (A). 
A very narrow construction for the FTP Grace Period Exception for third-
party materials forces patent applicants to resort to use of the FTP exceptions 
under subparagraph (A) that protect against unauthorized works of third parties 
that are derived from the inventor’s work. Elsewhere in the Proposed Examination 
Guidelines, the Patent Office has appropriately chosen to utilize standards for 
proving derivation that adopts the approach taken in the In re Facius53 decision in 
interferences for defining “derivation” in the context of the FITF provisions to 
cover situations where proof of the main elements of an invention having been 
conveyed is sufficient to cover any obvious variations that are derived from the 
information conveyed. 54  The Proposed Examination Guidelines reject the 
approach taken in the Gambro55 decision in the context of proving derivation in 
an interference that requires proof that each and every element of a claimed 
invention has been communicated to the alleged deriver.56 While this is the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767 (proposed July 26, 2012) (the 
“Proposed Rules”) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also id. at 43,769 (using much of the 
same language). 
52 USPTO Roundtable Discussion at the Madison Auditorium, Alexandria VA (Sept. 6, 2012). 
53 408 F.2d 1396, 1407 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
54 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,769. 
55 Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
56 Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 43,769. 
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result for proving derivation in the FTP Grace Period Exception for the inventor’s 
own work, it produces an asymmetry in how the FTP Grace Period Exceptions 
will operate under subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (B). The end result would 
be that patent applicants will resort to the subparagraph (A) FTP Grace Period 
Exception in cases of intervening prior art that is close to, but not exactly identical 
to, subject matter disclosed by or for the inventor in order to have any ability to 
argue that the differences are merely obvious variations that are somehow based 
on the inventor’s work, and that the intervening prior art should be excluded. 
It is a tenant of statutory construction that an interpretation of a statute should 
not render superfluous any of the provisions of that statute.57 If the narrow 
standard for evaluating the FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party materials 
is finally adopted, there would be no ability for inventors to effectively use the 
FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party-related materials as found in New 
Section 102(b) subparagraph (B). 
IV.  POLICY ARGUMENTS 
In addition to the statutory construction problems with the narrow standard for 
FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party-related materials, there are also 
several important policy reasons for why the adoption of the proposed standard is 
a bad idea. At the highest level for the U.S. patent system as a whole, the impact 
of the narrow standard can be seen as cutting against the recognized AIA policy 
of encouraging early disclosure of new inventions.58 On an individual level, the 
effect on both patent applicants and patent examiners will be burdensome and 
difficult to manage. 
Without a doubt, the optimum patent filing strategy is always to file for patent 
protection before there is any public disclosure of subject matter for an invention. 
For larger companies and more experienced entrepreneurs, it is expected that 
these players will respond to the AIA by operating as if the new FITF provisions 
create a de facto First-To-File patent system in the United States. For smaller 
companies, universities and individual inventors who are new to the patent 
system, that kind of rigorous approach is simply not feasible, and it is very likely 
that these players will be tripped up by the new FITF provisions with the 
proposed narrow FTP Grace Period Exception for third-party-related materials.  
For patent applicants who try to utilize the FTP Grace Period Exceptions, 
there will be tremendous extra effort and expense needed to preserve evidence for 
possible derivation proceedings, police disclosures made before patent filings can 
be put in place, and rework disclosure to expand them so as to cover as many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
58 S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 4–5 (2009). 
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insubstantial, trivial or obvious variations as possible. For examiners and the 
Patent Office, the strong incentives created by the asymmetry between the FTP 
Grace Period Exceptions for an inventor’s own materials versus third-party-
related materials will result in a significant increase in the use of derivation 
petitions by patent applicants faced with intervening prior art of third parties.  
Given the already massive workloads faced by the new Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB), adoption of the narrow construction in the Proposed Examination 
Guidelines may overwhelm the system with derivation petition filings that would 
be orders of magnitude above the numbers currently projected. 
Congress has confirmed the bright-line rule of one-year in the public domain 
as being the absolute upper limit to any exceptions to the new FITF patent system 
under the New 102(b). Existing case law has been built around the statutory 
framework of Old Section 102(b) that provides for a one-year complete grace 
period for public disclosures. Even the inventor's own earlier disclosures could 
serve as an inherent disclosure, that disclosure may anticipate a subsequent patent 
application by the inventor if the subject matter inherently disclosed was in the 
public domain for more than the one-year grace period.59 However, unlike the 
current automatic and fixed one-year grace period of Old Section 102(b), the 
First-To-Publish Grace Period Exceptions under the FITF provisions of the AIA 
are conditional in application and variable in length. In order to be invoked, the 
FTP Grace Period Exceptions must be triggered by a “disclosure” that is public in 
the sense that acts/things that are considered publicly available for purposes of 
New Section 102(a). Also, once an FTP Grace Period Exception has been 
triggered, it is not an unlimited grace period; rather the FTP Grace Period 
Exception can be no longer, and in many situations will be less than, a maximum 
one-year period from the first public disclosure triggering the FTP Grace Period 
Exception and the effective filing date of the patent application under 
consideration. That first triggering public disclosure can be either a public 
disclosure of, or based on, the inventor’s own work (under New Section 
102(b)(1)), or a publication of, or based on, the inventor’s own patent filing 
(under New Section 102(b)(2)). 
Contrary to the concerns expressed by some commentators, the choice of 
whether to interpret the FTP Grace Period Exceptions narrowly or broadly will 
never turn the FITF provisions of the AIA into a de facto “first-to-publish” patent 
system. If a patent applicant is first to publish, but that triggering publication 
event occurs earlier than the one-year maximum grace period before the effective 
filing date of the patent application under consideration, “first-to-publish” does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405–06 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
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not (i) protect that patent applicant from the triggering publication itself, or (ii) 
protect the patent applicant from any intervening publications or patent filing that 
occur between the triggering publication and the effective filing date of the patent 
application under consideration. The FTP Grace Period Exceptions under the AIA 
are exactly that—exceptions that apply only once triggered by a first-to-publish 
triggering publication and, once triggered, apply only to events that occur within a 
limited time of the “grace” period.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the Proposed Examination Guidelines the Patent Office has interpreted 
New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B) so narrowly that, if adopted, it would 
render the FTP Grace Period Exception for third parties effectively meaningless. 
Accordingly, if an inventor makes a public disclosure of his invention he is at 
serious risk that a third party will republish his work with some variation in order 
to practically render the subject matter of the inventor’s publication unpatentable. 
We propose that the Patent Office adopt a more symmetric and broader 
interpretation of New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B). A broader interpretation, 
consistent with New Section 102(b) subparagraph (A), would have a number of 
desirable effects. It would encourage early disclosure by inventors, rather than 
promote a fear that a third party will republish to destroy patentability. It reduces 
the burden on the Patent Office, in that Examiners already know how to apply the 
standard of “patentably distinct” to determine whether the New Section 102(b) 
subparagraph (B) exception would apply. It would eliminate the need for patent 
applicants to police derivation and/or variation issues in their publications. Also, 
it would preserve Patent Office resources by avoiding the inevitable deluge of 
derivation petitions that will be filed if the interpretation of New Section 102(b) 
subparagraph (B) in the Proposed Examination Guidelines is adopted. 
VI.  POST SCRIPT 
In response to these Proposed Rules, the authors—through the Minnesota 
Intellectual Property Law Association (MIPLA)—submitted an early version of 
this article to the USPTO as comments.60 The Final Rules, which were published 
on February 14, 2013, addressed some, but not all, of the arguments made in this 
article.61 Nevertheless, the Final Rules maintained the narrow construction for the 
FTP Grace Period Exception of subparagraph (B) essentially as presented in the 
Proposed Rules that are discussed in this article. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  See Letter from Brad Pedersen to Mary C. Till, supra note 1.	  
61 See Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,059–87 (Feb. 14, 2013) (the “Final 
Rules”) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).	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Specifically, under the Final Rules, the New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B) 
exceptions for intervening works of third parties are triggered under the USPTO’s 
interpretation only when the subject matter disclosed by or for the inventor is “the 
same” as the subject matter of the intervening work. However, under the Final 
Rules “the same” does not mean “the same,” as the subject matter later disclosed 
by the third party may be: (1) in a different form, (2) not verbatim, or (3) more 
general than the subject matter later disclosed by or for the inventor. 
These examination guidelines maintain the identical subject matter 
interpretation of [subparagraph (B) as set forth in the Proposed 
Rules] . . . . However, . . . there is no requirement [for 
subparagraph (B)] that the mode of disclosure by the inventor or a 
joint inventor (e.g., [patenting,] publication, public use, sale 
activity) be the same as the mode of disclosure of the intervening 
[grace period] disclosure . . . [there is also no requirement] that the 
disclosure by the inventor or a joint inventor be a verbatim or 
ipsissimis verbis disclosure of the intervening [grace period] 
disclosure.62 
[I]f the subject matter of an intervening grace period disclosure is 
simply a more general description of the subject matter previously 
publicly disclosed by the inventor, . . . the exception in [New 
Section 102(b) subparagraph (B) will apply] . . . . For example, if 
the inventor . . . had publicly disclosed a species, and a subsequent 
intervening grace period disclosure discloses a genus (i.e., provides 
a more generic disclosure of the species), the intervening grace 
period disclosure of the genus is not available as prior art under 
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). [But,] if the inventor . . . had publicly 
disclosed a genus, and a subsequent intervening grace period 
disclosure discloses a species, the intervening grace period 
disclosure of the species would be available as prior art under AIA 
35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). Likewise, if the inventor . . . had publicly 
disclosed a species, and a subsequent intervening grace period 
disclosure discloses an alternative species not also disclosed by the 
inventor[s], . . . the intervening grace period disclosure of the 
alternative species would be available as prior art under AIA 35 
U.S.C. 102(a)(1).63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Id. at 11,061. 
63 Id. at 11,077 (emphasis added).  
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Accordingly, inventors should take caution in making their inventions 
publicly available prior to an appropriate patent filing. Given the USPTO’s 
narrow interpretation of New Section 102(b) subparagraph (B), inventors should 
not rely on the FTP Grace Period Exception. The safest approach after March 16, 
2013 is for inventors to treat the AIA as if it were a first to file patent system, just 
as if the inventor wanted to seek international patent protection. A strategy 
whereby the inventor files first, then publishes, represents the best case for 
obtaining patent protection and will reduce the potential complexity in filing and 
prosecuting U.S. cases that may otherwise be associated with attempting to 
invoke any of the Section 102(b) Grace Periods. Because the Final Rules provide 
for a narrow interpretation of the FTP Grace Period Exception for subparagraph 
(B), it will not be possible in advance to determine what will or will not be 
considered prior art. Therefore, applicants cannot confidently rely on having a 
meaningful FTP Grace Period Exception with respect to independently developed 
works of third parties that may occur during the one-year period prior to filing a 
patent application.	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